

## Seminar Labor Market Tournaments Summer Term 2020

Schwerpunktmodul Managerial Economics, Kennnummer 1289SMME00

Prof. Dr. Oliver Gürtler

### Title: “Labor Market Tournaments“

The seminar is paper-based and addresses labor market tournaments from a theoretical, empirical and experimental perspective. Your task in the seminar will be to write a thesis/paper about your assigned topic and to present this thesis during the seminar. Please note that you should be able to be present on April 09, 2020 for the kick-off meeting and on July 16 and July 17, 2020 for the presentations.

#### Application

You have to apply for the seminar via **KLIPS 2.0**. You can apply during the **first registration period** (1. Belegphase) from **January 29, 2020 until February 11, 2020** and during the second registration period (2. Belegphase) from **March 03, 2020 until March 23, 2020**. Note that the **number of participants is limited**. Hence, we cannot guarantee your participation in the seminar – especially if you (only) apply during the second registration period as there may not be any open spots left after the first registration period.

#### Assignment of topics

All successful applicants have to attend the **mandatory kick-off meeting on April 09, 2020**. Further information regarding the assignment of topics will be provided there.

#### Deadline seminar thesis

The thesis must be handed in by **June 12, 2020** at the latest.

#### Presentations

The seminar is held on **July 16** and **July 17, 2020**.

The following topics will be addressed in the seminar. Please take a look at the topics **before** you attend the kick-off meeting, so you have a better idea which topic to choose.

If you require further information, please contact Prof. Dr. Oliver Gürtler ([oliver.guertler@uni-koeln.de](mailto:oliver.guertler@uni-koeln.de)).

### Topics

1. **Tournaments and Incentives – Theory** (Lazear, E.P. and S. Rosen, 1981, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, *Journal of Political Economy*, 89, 841-864)
2. **Tournaments and Incentives – Empirical Evidence** (Ehrenberg, R.G. and M.L. Bognanno, 1990, *Journal of Political Economy*, 98, 1307-1324)
3. **Sabotage in Tournaments – Theory** (Lazear, E.P., 1989, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, *Journal of Political Economy*, 97, 561- 580)
4. **Sabotage in Tournaments – Empirical Evidence** (Garicano, L. and Palacios-Huerta, I., 2005, Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful, In *Beautiful Game Theory*, Chapter 8, Princeton University Press, 124-150)

5. **Gender Differences in Competitive Environments** (Niederle, M. and Vesterlund, L., 2007, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3), 1067-11)
6. **Tournaments and Social Preferences** (Grund, C. and D. Sliwka, 2005, Envy and Compassion in Tournaments, *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 14, 187-207)
7. **Tournaments and Heterogeneity – Theory** (Gürtler, O. and M. Kräkel, 2010, Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 75(2), 180-191)
8. **Tournaments and Heterogeneity – Empirical Evidence** (Lynch, J.G., 2005, The Effort Effects of Prizes in the Second Half of Tournaments, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 57, 115-129)