Resumé

Prof. Dr. Oliver Gürtler, born in 1978, studied Economics in Bonn and worked as a student assistant in different departments. Later he was an academic assistant at a chair of business studies. He received his doctor's degree in 2006 for the dissertation "Incentives and the Organization of Institutions" and was promoted to professor in 2009. In the same year the University of Cologne appointed him to a professorship. Since then Prof. Dr. Gürtler has been a university professor at the Department of Economics. In 2016, he finished his studies of mathematics at University of Hagen. Since 2017 he is affiliated professor at the Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies. His papers have been published in renowned international professional journals, e.g. in the
International Economic Review, in the RAND Journal of Economics, in the Journal of Labor Economics, in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, in the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization and in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. In 2017 the newspaper Handelsblatt listed Prof. Dr. Gürtler on rank 15 of the top 100 German-speaking economists under 40 years of age.

Curriculum Vitae (of 05/2020)

Selected Publications

• Firm Choice and Career Success — Theory and Evidence. Forthcoming in European Economic Review  (with Christian Deutscher, Marc Gürtler and Jed DeVaro)
• Strategic Shirking in Competitive Labor Markets: A General Model of Multi-Task Promotion Tournaments with Employer Learning. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 29 (2020), pp. 335-376 (with Jed DeVaro)
• Promotion Signaling, Discrimination, and Positive Discrimination Policies.  RAND Journal of Economics 50 (2019), pp. 1004-1027 (with Marc Gürtler)
• Do good and talk about it! Disclosure and Reward of Discretionary Kindness. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 161 (2019), pp. 323-342 (with Gari Walkowitz and Daniel Wiesen) 
• Market-Based Tournaments: An Experimental Investigation. Labour Economics 51 (2018), pp. 294-306 (with Lisa Dickmanns and Marc Gürtler)
• Advertising and Labor Market Matching: A Tour Through the Times. Journal of Labor Economics 36 (2018), pp. 253-307 (with Jed DeVaro)
• The Payoff to Consistency in Performance. Economic Inquiry 55 (2017), pp. 1091-1103 (with Christian Deutscher, Joachim Prinz and Daniel Weimar)
• Strategic Shirking in Promotion Tournaments. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32 (2016), pp. 620-651 (with Jed DeVaro)
• Strategic Shirking: A Theoretical Analysis of Multitasking and Specialization. International Economic Review  57 (2016), pp. 507-532 (with Jed DeVaro)
• The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics 33 (2015), pp. 1007-1042 (with Marc Gürtler)
• Monitoring of workers and product market competition: The role of works councils. Economic Inquiry 53 (2015), pp. 1366-1379 (with Felix Höffler)
• Sabotage in Contests: A Survey. Public Choice 164 (2015), pp. 135-155 (with Subhasish Modak Chowdhury)
• The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014), pp. 135-146 (with Marc Gürtler)
• Communication and Commitment in Contests. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013), pp. 1-19 (with Qiang Fu and Johannes Münster)
• Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Emprirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115 (2013), pp. 1138-1157 (with Christian Deutscher, Bernd Frick and Joachim Prinz)
• Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115 (2013), pp. 932-966 (with Johannes Münster and Petra Nieken)
• Inequality Aversion and Externalities. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012), pp. 111-117 (with Marc Gürtler)
• Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012), pp. 403-420 (with Thomas Giebe)
• The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments. Economics Letters 111 (2011), pp. 185-187
• Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 19 (2010), pp. 771-810 (with Christine Harbring)
• Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75 (2010), pp. 180-191 (with Matthias Kräkel)
• Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 26 (2010), pp. 337-364 (with Matthias Kräkel)
• Sabotage in Dynamic Tournaments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010), pp. 179-190 (with Johannes Münster)
• On the Inefficiency of Merger Control. Economics Letters 102 (2009), pp. 53-55 (with Matthias Kräkel)
• On Sabotage in Collective Tournaments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008), pp. 383-393

Working Papers

• Big Fish in Small (and Big) Ponds - A Study of Careers (with Jed DeVaro, Marc Gürtler and Christian Deutscher)
• A general framework for studying contests (with Spencer Bastani and Thomas Giebe)